Showing posts with label immune system. Show all posts
Showing posts with label immune system. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 6, 2011

Bacterial Resistance/Tolerance or Prepared Environments

A significant problem currently faced in the field of immunology is the proliferation of bacteria which have gained resistance or tolerance to antibiotics.  Bacteria can gain resistance or tolerance by a number of different methods; 1) by evolving genes which allow them to survive, 2) by acquiring genes via from other bacteria (transduction by a bacteriophage or conjugation [e.g. horizontal gene transfer]), or 3) uptake of genetic material from the environment (transformation).  Bacteria such as these are responsible for a large number of infections that are difficult to treat and are becoming more common in environments such as hospitals.  Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is one such example.  Although MRSA is resistant to most antibiotics, it has a lower fitness than non-antibiotic resistant Staphylococcus aureus (Staph) in an environment without antibiotics.  This trait means that if the antibiotics treatments are stopped, the common forms of Staph will out compete and replace MRSA as the dominant form of bacteria in a colony.

It is possible that such observations could lead some people within the information security community to believe that possibly reducing the barriers to malware could cause malware to become less sophisticated or more easy to observe and subsequently easier to remediate.  Although this is a possibility, it is unlikely since the costs involved in maintaining genes are different than those in maintaining attack strategies.  Evolutionary trade-offs or costs manifest themselves in different ways.  They are paid by the reduction of the fitness of an organism.  An organism is said to have a higher fitness with the more off-spring that survive into subsequent generations.  An organism which must reallocate resources away from the production off-spring runs the risk of reducing its fitness.  As an example, removing resources away from reproduction to defense, reduces the theoretical number of off-spring and organism can produce.  Defensive strategies can allow an organism to survive and reproduce.  Mutations in a genome cause an organism to reallocate resources and depending on the phenotypic effects, they can increase or decrease the fitness of an organism.  Evolutionary costs can be thought of as having three different costs and benefits: 1) there is a cost of evolving a strategy (e.g. the costs associated with the creation of a new strategy), 2) there are developmental costs of a strategy (e.g. the specific implementation of within an organism), and 3) there is a cost for maintaining a strategy (e.g. the day-to-day costs associated with maintaining a strategy or maintaining the ability to utilize a strategy).  These three costs combined with the benefits of maintaining a set of strategies work in conjunction to raise or lower the overall fitness of an organism.

With bacteria, the reduction of any non-essential genes results in an increased fitness as the costs associated with replication are reduced.  The replication of a smaller genome utilizes less resources than the replication of a larger genome.  This reduction means that anytime a gene can successfully be removed from the bacterial genome without reducing its fitness, it will benefit for the bacteria to do so as it will reduce the costs associated with replication.  This process is referred to as genome economization and has been observed with the Mimivirus in a controlled laboratory setting and the resulting genome reduction in an environment in which its competitors have been removed.  In the case of tolerance or resistance genes, the costs to the bacteria are greater than just occupying a portion of the genome and increasing its size.  There are production costs associated with tolerance or resistance genes.  These genes create proteins and the production of these proteins consumes resources that the bacteria could have utilized elsewhere.  Beyond the simple consumption of resources due to the production of these proteins, these proteins that are being produced can interfere with common intracellular functions.  All of these factors combined mean that bacteria can make substantial gains in fitness if they are able to remove these genes when they are no longer required.  In the case of malware or the tools of determined attackers, the replication and storage of the software used is not a significant issue.  In the case of exploits with stagers or malware with droppers being able to remotely load software the advantages of maintaining a smaller code base are not a limitation as resources can be remotely accessed as needed.  Actually having a smaller code base to utilize during an attack can limit the options of an adversary as they may not be able to try all of the possible avenues of attack.  Blind application of the strategies and methods used by organism for survival may not function as expected within information security without understanding the costs and trade-offs associated with these strategies.  The adaptations that bacteria and other micro-organisms utilize for dealing with evolutionary costs are different than those encountered within information security.

Another thing to consider is that even if antibiotics are not applied in the environment to reduce the population of tolerant or resistant bacteria, it does not mean that the human immune system is not going to react to an infection.  A substantial portion of the human genome is dedicated to the immune system.  Of the entire genome (estimated at 27,478 genes), it is estimated that there are approximately 1,562 genes are dedicated to the immune system.  This quantity of genes represents a significant amount of resources dedicated to fighting pathogens.  Furthermore when the immune system is actively fighting a pathogen an average metabolism of a human host increases by 14%.  Maybe simply reducing the application of security controls to fight malware is not the best solution.

Looking at the issue of bacteria gaining tolerance and resistance from a different perspective may provide another insight into the issue.  The problem is not that MRSA exists in the environment but it exists within an environment in which the potential hosts are already suffering from weakened or compromised immune systems.  The resistance of MRSA means that the application of traditional antibiotics is ineffective.  It seems that the main issue is that MRSA already has the tools to defend itself against the common defenses in that environment.  To rephrase this, MSRA has the tools to persist in the prevailing environmental conditions otherwise it would not have survived.  From the perspective of information security, attackers have already acquired the necessary tools and techniques to persist in the common computing environments otherwise they would not be successful.  Furthermore the tools and techniques that have used previously in compromising similar security controls means that if those security controls are encountered else where they can also be compromised as they have been primed with the necessary experience.

Instead of reducing the security controls in an enterprise to possibly make the detection and remediation of malware based on observations of various bacterial adaptations to antibiotics, security should instead attempt to understand how the environment is being prepared for attackers and focus on making it more difficult for attackers to persist in the enterprise.

Tuesday, July 7, 2009

Reducing the Time for Adaptation

Periodically security professionals and security vendors tout the idea that reducing the reaction time between an event and employing a counter strategy can potentially resolve the evolutionary arms races within information security. This idea is similar to an Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop.

In strategy, there is Boyd's OODA loop which emphasizes the idea that reducing the time required for planning and reacting faster than an opponent will provide an advantage and subsequently enhances the likelihood of the opponent making a mistake. By deceasing the time that is required to react appropriately to a situation, the initiative is maintained and consequently an opponent is always responding to the situation. The more time an opponent spends reacting, the less time they have to observe and plan; increasing the likelihood that a mistake will be made. This concept has been raised recently on the panel discussions at the CATCH 2009 conference. References to this particular type of strategy, arise periodically from malware vendors in that if the time between the release of malware and the release of generally available anti-malware signatures can be reduced, it could help to solve or alleviate the malware threat.

Applying the OODA loop or simply reducing the reaction time could potentially go a long way towards helping to alleviate the malware threat. But, it should be considered that malware will always be able to evolve more quickly than an operating system, a web application, a database or even the anti-malware tool as it has the initiative and malware is typically smaller in size and less complex. Looking at this strategy from an evolutionary biology perspective, it is similar to the Red Queen hypothesis that occurs between diseases/parasites and their hosts. It is also similar to the evolutionary arms race between malware and the rest of the information security community (anti-virus,browsers, office automation applications, operating systems, application services, etc). Viruses have genomes on the order of 10^4 base pairs, bacteria have genomes on the order of 2x10^6 base pairs, and humans have genomes on the order of 6.6x10^9 base pairs (Evolution 3rd Edition, Ridley). Modern operating systems have about 40 - 55 million lines of code (equating to 2.5 - 4 GB installed), while most malware is a few orders of magnitude smaller, approximately 119 - 134 KB in the case of Conficker.

As is the case with viruses and other more complex organisms within the real world, smaller organisms are capable of evolving at a much faster rate than large complex organisms. Consider the case of RNA viruses which have a mutation rate of about 1 mutation/generation. While bacteria have about 10^-3 mutations/generation, and humans have about 200 mutations/generation (Evolution 3rd Edition, Ridley and Evolutionary Biology 3rd Edition, Futuyma). Some diseases mutate frequently enough that every replication event experiences the likelihood that the disease will have changed. Although humans have a much higher mutation rate than diseases (such as viruses and bacteria), the generation span of a human is much longer than that of most diseases. The generation lifespan on a human is on the order of 15 - 30 years, while diseases typically have generation lifespans on the order of seconds to minutes. Per unit time diseases (e.g. viruses and bacteria) can evolve much more rapidly, and yet large complex organisms are able to survive as they have strategies which allow them to combat these adaptations. Despite the rate at which diseases are capable of evolving, they do not always win. Influenzavirus has the potential of being fatal but in most cases it is not considered life threatening.

Large complex organisms have multiple methods for allowing them to survive in an environment where diseases can rapidly evolve. Entities with smaller genomes have effectively less space in which to maintain a set of strategies which they can use to exploit their environment, while larger more complex organisms have more space in which they can record their survival strategies. Some bacteria use enzymes to protect against viral infections. Eukaryotes employ even more defenses against infection, while entities like vertebrates have evolved immune systems which are capable of responding to infection by disease. One segment of the Human genome, the Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC) contains approximately 3.6 million base pairs or 140 genes which control a portion of the human immunological system. As of October 2004, the Immunogenetic Related Information Source (IRIS) database estimates the percentage of the human genome that controls the human immune system is approximately 7%, or 1562 genes. Although the percentage of the human genome related to the human immune system seems small, it is important to consider that a significant portion of the human genome is inactive. It is estimated that 25% of the genome is attributed to diseases which have inserted their genetic code into our genome and are now inactive, while other sections contain pseudogenes which are no inactive version of ancient genes. The percentage of the human active genome which relates to the immune system could be substantially higher than currently theorized. The cost of surviving in an evolutionary arms race can be high, as significant resources are required to defend an organism from infection by diseases and parasites.

Recently researchers, such as Banerjee in An Immune System Inspired Approach to Automated Program Verification, have looked at applying some of the methods that the immune system uses for protecting itself from disease by investigating an Automated Immune System (AIS) which can be implemented in information systems.

Implementing an immune system to handle rapidly evolving threats does not eradicate the threat. Immune systems will act as a selection pressure that will cause only those diseases which are capable of adapting to survive. Some adaptations can include methods for remaining undetected by the immune system, while others can include methods for exploiting the immune system and subverting it for its own use. In essence, these systems represent another vector in which disease can exploit a host. Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) actively exploits the immune system; even at the cost of its own reproductive fitness to remain active in the host to survive when anti-HIV drugs are administered. Similarly with anti-malware products, flaws in these systems have allowed malware to exist and even spread in the form of computer worms. Malicious code routinely attempts to disable anti-virus before downloading and installing malicious components. In order to remain undetected, some malware will re-enable the anti-virus products to prevent the user from noticing anything conspicuous. Anti-virus software is complex enough that it has its own vulnerabilities which may be exploited by malware. In 2006, Symantec Anti-virus had a vulnerability (CVE-2006-2630) which allowed for a privilege escalation that was exploited by the W32.Rinbot.L worm.

Simply reducing the response time will not eradicate the threat. It will provide an advantage but it will not solve the problem. In order to respond to diseases which are able to quickly adapt to host evolutionary responses, large complex organisms have had to evolve complex responses that do not rely on a single strategy to ensure their survival. The cost of ensuring survival in an evolutionary arms race can be high, as numerous strategies need to be available to counter act the threat of disease and parasites.